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State
Governments have developed labour pains on transition to VAT.
The possible revenue loss in States with a large spread in the
rate of Tax and more goods in higher tax slabs may be
substantial. The States now look towards the Centre, for
maintenance of the VAT baby after it is born, for after all
the Centre is the father of VAT. The father is undecided and
is alternatively suggesting the Mother (State Governments) to
look after the baby by itself and at times reluctantly
agreeing to share the maintenance cost. Is the Centre reacting
like a responsible father?
The
loss to the States with a smaller spread of rates and maximum
rate of tax less than 20% is not likely to be substantial as
the existing rates of tax may require only little adjustment
to fit into the proposed VAT rates.
The
slab rates1 in different States various from a low
of six rates to a high of 15 rates and the maximum rate of tax
(excluding on liquor) is between 15% to 33%
|
States |
Minimum
rate |
Maximum rate2 |
Number of Rates |
|
Andhra Pradesh |
0% |
20% |
10 |
|
Assam |
0% |
20% |
6 |
|
Delhi |
0% |
20% |
7 |
|
Gujarat |
0% |
22% |
12 |
|
Haryana |
0% |
20% |
9 |
|
Jammu and Kashmir |
1% |
30% |
6 |
|
Karnataka |
0% |
20% |
11 |
|
Kerala |
1% |
30% |
13 |
|
Madhya Pradesh |
0% |
25% |
8 |
|
Maharashtra |
0% |
33% |
14 |
|
Meghalaya |
0% |
25% |
7 |
|
Nagaland |
0% |
20% |
6 |
|
Rajasthan |
0% |
22% |
12 |
|
Sikkim |
0% |
20% |
7 |
|
Himachal Pradesh |
0% |
15% |
11 |
|
Orissa |
0% |
20% |
11 |
|
Punjab |
0% |
20% |
11 |
|
Tamil Nadu |
0% |
30% |
153 |
|
Tripura |
0% |
20% |
13 |
|
Uttar Pradesh |
0% |
32.5% |
15 |
|
West Bengal |
0% |
20% |
15 |
Source: Paper on Road Map
for National and Sub-National VATs in India by Dr. Mahesh C Purohit
1. The rate structure in different
States are before hormonisation with the uniform sales tax floor rates
2. The maximum rates are exclusive
of rate of tax of liquor.
3. The
number or rates now is 14 with the merging of 11% goods in the 12%
slab w.e.f 1-12-2001.
The
major source of revenue for the States comes from Petroleum
Products and Liquor. The rates of tax of liquor are not likely
to be lowered under VAT and these goods may not be covered
under VAT.
Most
of the States have a surcharge on sales tax and Additional
Sales Tax of 1% to 3%. Under VAT there will be no place for
surcharge and Additional Sales Tax and the States will have to
contend with revenue loss on scrapping of these levies.
Further
raw materials and capital goods, in most of the States, are
subject to tax at concessional rate of tax of 3% to 4%. Under
VAT, the concessional rate of tax will not apply. The raw
materials and capital goods will be subject to tax at the
rates applicable. The loss to the Government is that input tax
rebate will apply to raw materials and on capital goods also
(though on capital goods input tax rebate may be deferred) and
the Government may not realise the 3% to 4% taxes that was
hitherto collected.
The
loss of revenue in a State with predominantly revenue from
manufacturing sector is therefore likely to be higher than a
State, which imports from other States and where most of the
revenue is realised from trading activity. If the revenue
neutral rate is not fixed at a higher level, loss on
transition to VAT, particularly in highly industrialised
States, is unavoidable.
The
State Governments, to protect revenue loss, is likely to fix a
higher RNR which will result in price hike across the board
and the poor consumer will have to bear the brunt as
ultimately is the consumer, you and me, who pay the tax.
The
impact on prices on introduction of VAT in several countries
was as follows:
|
Country |
Date VAT Introduced |
Immediate Price Change General
(In %)
|
|
Argentina |
Jan.
1975 |
57.2 |
|
Austria |
Jan.
1973 |
2.4 |
|
Belgium |
Jan.
1971 |
2.6 |
|
Bolivia |
Oct.
1973 |
9.5 |
|
Brazil |
Jan.
1967 |
15.8 |
|
Chile |
Mar.
1975 |
146.7 |
|
Colombia |
Jan.
1975 |
12.9 |
|
Costa Rica |
Jan.
1975 |
---- |
|
Cote d’ Voire |
Jan.
1960 |
---- |
|
Denmark |
July
1967 |
8.0 |
|
Ecuador |
July
1970 |
8.7 |
|
France |
Jan.
1968 |
2.1 |
|
Federal
Republic of Germany |
Jan.
1968 |
1.5 |
|
Honduras |
Jan.
1976 |
1.0 |
|
Indonesia |
Apr.
1985 |
3.5 |
|
Ireland |
Nov.
1972 |
5.5 |
|
Israel |
July
1972 |
17.9 |
|
Italy |
Jan.
1973 |
6.3 |
|
Korea |
July
1977 |
4.1 |
|
Luxembourg |
Jan.
1970 |
3.5 |
|
Madagascar |
Jan.
1969 |
3.2 |
|
Mexico |
Jan.
1980 |
-- |
|
Morocco |
Jan.
1962 |
2.4 |
|
Netherlands |
Jan.
1969 |
5.2 |
|
New Zealand |
Oct.
1986 |
8.9 |
|
Nicaragua |
Jan.
1975 |
---- |
|
Norway |
Jan.
1970 |
7.8 |
|
Panama |
Mar.
1977 |
5.0 |
|
Peru |
July
1976 |
27.1 |
|
Portugal |
Jan.
1986 |
10.0 |
|
Senegal |
Mar.
1961 |
---- |
|
Spain |
Jan.
1986 |
2.8 |
|
Sweden |
Jan.
1969 |
1.6 |
|
Turkey |
Jan.
1985 |
40.0 |
|
United Kingdom |
Apr.
1973 |
4.9 |
|
Uruguay |
Jan.
1968 |
66.3 |
Source:
IMF Data and various Country reports reported in seminar
papers of CII
It
may be seen from the above table that price change in
developed countries are lower than in developing economies.
Fixing
a higher RNR to completely offset the possible revenue loss is
not desirable, as it would be politically inadvisable besides
being inflationary. Should the Governments try to make the
transition to VAT a zero sum game by fixing a higher RNR?
It
took the Centre 4 years to align and rationalise the Central
Excise Rates. Should the States be expected to align the
existing large rate structure in one budget? The States should
be allowed 2-3 years time frame to align the rates of tax into
a three rate structure.
States
like Tamilnadu and Kerala have resorted to levy of Entry tax
to shore up revenue. One may see a mini budget, as in
Tamilnadu, prior to introduction of VAT.
The
Centre must dissuade the States from fixing a higher RNR or
from levying additional taxes in the form of entry tax or
luxury tax to compensate the loss due to transition to VAT. In
fact, the Centre should give fiscal incentives to States
implementing VAT. After all it is only on the insistence of
the Centre that most of the Governments are switching over to
VAT.
Though
the possible revenue loss on switch over to VAT is difficulty
to quantify, Tamil Nadu have estimated the possible revenue
loss at Rs.600 crores. The estimated revenue loss to Andhra
Pradesh is Rs.300 crores, according to Mr. Ramakrishnulu,
Minister of Finance, Andhra Pradesh.
One
of the avenues contemplated to recoup the revenue loss is to
allow States to levy service tax. Constitutional amendment
will be required to allow independent levy of service tax by
the States. Therefore it has been reported that the Centre is
contemplating retaining the power to levy service tax and to
fix the rate of tax, and to allow the States to collect and
retain service tax on 25 services.
If
this happens imagine a situation where different States have
different services liable to tax and don't you foresee a
situation similar situation in sales tax on the cross border
differences in the levy of tax.
Further
the state governments are already over burdened with the task
of grappling with the transition to VAT. Requiring them to
handle service tax as well will be a tall order.
The
proposal to allow the State Governments to collect and retain
service tax on 25 services to offset the possible revenue loss
in the course of switching over to VAT appears to be a short
sighted move, particularly when the long term focus is to
bring all taxes in the VAT structure. Dual levy of service tax
by the Centre as well as by the States will lead to more
centers of powers and consequent harassment of taxpayers.
Service tax needs to be integrated in the VAT structure. If
there is a State service tax and Central service tax, will
service tax paid to the Centre be given a setoff by the
States?
The
present levy of service tax by the Centre itself needs to be
reformed. There is a need to codify the present levy of
service tax in a self-contained comprehensive legislation. The
Centre has already initiated steps to reform the levy of
service tax and efforts should therefore be to codify the levy
of service tax properly under the existing Central levy.
The
scope of levy of service tax must be enlarged to cover more
services, if not all the services excluding basic services
predominately used by the middle and lower income group of the
society. In an economy, basically the users of manufactured
products are the middle and lower income group and the users
of service belong to the higher income group.
For
instance, levying a service tax on the services of a specialty
hospital will only tax the rich who are the users of the
service. A rich person may find it is relatively easier to
evade income tax but evasion in service tax may be difficult
has the service industry is better organised.
There
is a debate on the taxing of agricultural income. There are
very many big landlords who are in the high-income bracket but
are not taxed. These rich landlords definitely use a number of
services and by taxing services, they are also made to
contribute to the national exchequer.
The
Government should therefore levy tax on all the services
excluding of course the basic services that are mostly used by
the common man.
Service
tax should be integrated into the VAT structure. The Centre
should retain the administration of service tax and the
services that are taxed should be uniform throughout India.
Service tax relating to manufacturing or professional activity
should be given set off against either Cenvat, State VAT or
the service tax liability, at the option of the service tax
payer. The Centre should reimburse the input tax credit given
by the States. The additional revenue generated by taxing new
services may be used by the centre to compensate States the
revenue loss on transition to VAT.
The
States may be given powers to levy services tax only on
composite contracts which involved the supply of labour as
well as materials to avoid the present difficulties faced by
the States to levy tax on composite works contract.
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